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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal private attorney general statutes police conduct that would
be costly or impractical to police directly (or supplement direct
government enforcement) by authorizing and incentivizing private citizen
suits. Congress authorizes private citizens (the “private attorneys
general”) to bring suit by creating private rights of action. And Congress
incentivizes them to bring suit by including provisions guaranteeing
minimum statutory damages. 1 Particularly when brought as class actions,
private attorney general suits can be powerful enforcement mechanisms,
and the mere threat of them can strongly discourage potential violators.
The efficacy of private attorney general statutes is threatened,
however, by the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo v. Robins. 2
Spokeo held (1) that the doctrine of constitutional standing requires a
plaintiff to have suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete,” and (2) that
Congress cannot create an injury in fact merely by authorizing suit and
creating a statutory damages remedy. 3 Those holdings threaten to
undermine a line of cases where courts relied on the existence of a
statutory damages remedy to infer injury in fact (and standing). Before
* Visiting assistant professor, Duquesne University School of Law. Associate, Reed Smith LLP. J.D.,
Harvard Law School 2008. Ph.D., Tufts University 2003. Thanks to my colleagues and to the
participants in the Center for Constitutional Law’s 2017 symposium on “The Constitution and
Remedies” for their support, comments, and feedback on this article.
1. See, e.g., In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979, 988 (6th Cir. 2009) (“RESPA allows individuals to
police the marketplace in order to ensure impartiality of referrals and competition between settlement
service providers, thereby creating a market-wide deterrent against unnecessarily high settlement
costs. Ultimately, ‘[t]he purpose of the statute is to prevent certain practices that are harmful to all
consumers by establishing that consumers have a right not to be subject to those practices and
providing both public and private remedies of that right.’”).
2. 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016), as revised, (May 24, 2016).
3. Id. at 1548.
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Spokeo, courts reasoned that Congress’s inclusion of a statutory damages
remedy indicated an intent to make any statutory violation a redressable
injury in fact, regardless of whether the plaintiff alleges a material harm.
According to those courts, the injury in fact could be presumed because
the statutory damages provision relieved the plaintiff of the need to prove
a material injury.
But, although Spokeo holds that Congress cannot create standing
where there is no injury in fact, Spokeo also instructs courts to consider
“the judgment of Congress,” Congress’s ability to “identify intangible
harms that meet minimum Article III requirements,” and its decision to
“elevate” such harms by authorizing suit. 4 I argue that, even after Spokeo,
courts can and should consider the existence of a statutory damages
remedy to ascertain congressional intent about the existence of an injury
in fact. The congressional choice to authorize statutory damages should
remain a factor for the standing analysis.
When determining whether Congress has “identified” and “elevated”
an intangible harm into an injury in fact, courts should continue to
consider Congress’s choice of remedy. By including a statutory damages
remedy, Congress indicates, at minimum, that it has identified a wrong to
be curtailed, and that it believes individual suits are a reasonable and
effective means of doing so. Where a statute targets conduct that could
potentially harm an individual plaintiff, the inclusion of a statutory
damages remedy also indicates that Congress believes that the wrong is
injurious to individuals, even if its effects are nonmonetary or difficult to
quantify or identify.
Not all remedial schemes are created equal. Different statutes fall in
different places along a spectrum between true statutory damages schemes
and mere minimum damages schemes. The former—where Congress
authorizes both actual damages and, alternatively, statutory or liquidated
damages—support an inference that Congress intended to identify and
elevate an intangible harm into an injury in fact. The latter—where
Congress merely sets a floor for actual damages—do not support that
inference. I propose that, in the absence of more direct evidence, courts
should consider the particular structure and language of a statute’s
remedial provision to assess whether Congress intended to elevate an
intangible injury to the status of injury in fact.

4.

Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1997)).
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II. INFERRING INJURY IN FACT FROM STATUTORY DAMAGES BEFORE
AND AFTER SPOKEO V. ROBINS
Standing is a notoriously nebulous concept. 5 It is the name given to
“a party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a
duty or right.” 6 To demonstrate standing and make a claim in federal
court, a plaintiff must fulfill both prudential and constitutional
requirements. The prudential standing considerations are “judicially selfimposed limits,” 7 rooted in the courts’ view of their appropriate role, and
designed to avoid deciding “abstract questions of wide public significance
even though other governmental institutions may [in the court’s view] be
more competent to address the questions, and even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.” 8 Because
they are self-imposed, the prudential considerations can be overridden by
congressional enactments giving parties a right to sue. 9
But the constitutional standing requirements are “derived directly”
from the Constitution and impose jurisdictional limits and duties on the
federal courts that Congress cannot override. 10 Constitutional standing
requires: (1) that the plaintiff “have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical’”; (2) that there be a “causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of”; and (3) that the injury will “likely . . . be

5. “It is almost de rigueur for articles on standing to quote Professor Freund’s testimony to
Congress that the concept of standing is ‘among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public
law.’” Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1371, 1372 (1988) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 498 (1966)). Despite relatively recently
standardizing the elements for constitutional standing, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged the
frustration of trying to provide a clear definition. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words
when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in
all of the various cases decided by this Court which have discussed it, nor when we say that this very
fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph
definition.”); Assn. of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970)
(“Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.”).
6. Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
7. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
8. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
9. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014).
10. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” 11 Of those three requirements, injury
in fact has become the “[f]irst and foremost.” 12
The injury-in-fact requirement is deceptively easy to state, but
notoriously hard to pin down. Simply put, it means that you can only sue
in federal court if you have really been harmed. The inquiry is, as thenJudge Scalia put it in an influential 1983 article, like the “question that is
sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another’s actions:
‘What’s it to you?’” 13
Until recently, most courts and scholars focused on the second part
of that rude question; “What’s it to you.” 14 As Scalia advocated in his
1983 article and later held in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that part of
the question is embodied in the rigorous application of the requirement
that an injury in fact be “particularized,” i.e., that the injury “must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” 15 With Spokeo, however,
the focus shifted to the first part of the question: “what is it to you?” i.e.
what makes an injury in fact “concrete.” When is an injury real and
personal—not abstract or attenuated—enough to grant standing?
A.

Spokeo v. Robins

The metaphysical conundrum of what really constitutes an injury in
fact has always been lurking beneath the surface of cases on standing. 16
In Spokeo it crystallized as a separation-of-powers question: can
Congress, on its own, create a concrete injury in fact merely by granting
a right to sue for damages for a statutory violation? 17
11. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
12. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised, (May 24, 2016) (quoting Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)).
13. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557 n.1; see also, Scalia, supra note 13, at 892.
16. See Michael T. Morley, Spokeo: The Quasi-Hohfeldian Plaintiff and the Non-Federal
Federal Question, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2946482) (arguing that Spokeo creates a new category of “quasi-Hohfeldian”
plaintiffs who have suffered a particularized injury because their statutory rights were violated, but
no concrete harm because the violation caused no real damage); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing
after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 188-90 (1992) (“In
classifying some harms as injuries in fact and other harms as purely ideological, courts must inevitably
rely on some standard that is normatively laden and independent of facts. . . . [W]hether there is a socalled nonjusticiable ideological interest, or instead a legally cognizable ‘actual injury,’ is a product
of legal conventions and nothing else.”).
17. Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1548; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES: § 2.3, at 71 (5th ed. 2015) (noting that the “interesting question concerning
injuries to statutory rights is how far Congress can expand standing”); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET
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Spokeo was about the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). 18 The
FCRA requires credit reporting agencies to, among other things, “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” of the
information in credit reports. 19 It employs a private attorney general
mechanism for enforcement. It contains a private right of action provision,
authorizing individual consumers to sue for certain statutory violations. 20
And it awards consumers who prevail reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs, along with “any actual damages sustained.” 21 In cases of willful
noncompliance, it awards either “any actual damages sustained . . . or
damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.” 22 Thus, on its
face, the FCRA allows consumers to recover statutory damages for willful
noncompliance with an FCRA requirement relating to them—even if the
noncompliance did not materially harm them. The question the Supreme
Court faced in Spokeo was whether that congressional grant was sufficient
to create constitutional standing.
The facts of the plaintiff’s claim in Spokeo are not complex.
Spokeo.com is a “people search engine,” a website that allows users to
search for and obtain information about people, such as their ages,
addresses, employment, etc. 23 Thomas Robins sued Spokeo, alleging that
its online report about him was a credit report that contained factual
inaccuracies about his age, education, and employment status—and that
those inaccuracies were caused by Spokeo’s willful noncompliance with
the FCRA’s “reasonable procedures” requirement.24 Robins sued Spokeo
on his own behalf, and on behalf of a class of similarly situated
individuals—i.e., anyone whose reports were inaccurate due to the willful
failure to follow the FCRA’s procedural requirements.

AL., HART & WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 142 (6th ed. 2009)
(“[U]ncertainty surrounds the question of how much authority Congress possesses to define judicially
cognizable injuries that will provide Article III standing.”).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a)(1)(A)–1681o(a)(1).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A). The FCRA employs the commonplace legal shorthand of
“damages” to refer to both the injury sustained by a plaintiff and the remedy awarded by a court for
that injury. That shorthand has consequences and creates, if not ambiguity, a misleading impression
of equivalence. In this paper, I avoid the shorthand and try to keep the concepts distinct: plaintiffs are
“injured” or “harmed,” not “damaged” (or they suffer “injury” or “harm,” not “damages”); and courts
remedy that injury or harm by awarding “damages.”
23. Spokeo.com, https://www.spokeo.com/.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).
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The district court dismissed Robins’s complaint for lack of
constitutional standing, finding that he did not allege an injury in fact. 25
But the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Robins had alleged an injury
in fact, because he alleged that Spokeo’s alleged failure to comply with
the FCRA’s procedural requirements violated “his statutory rights, not
just the statutory rights of other people,” and because the personal interest
that Congress protected (namely the “personal interests in the handling of
[one’s] credit information”) was individualized rather than collective. 26
The Supreme Court found that reasoning unpersuasive and vacated
and remanded for further consideration. The Court found that the Ninth
Circuit had evaluated whether Robins’s alleged injury was
“particularized” but had not sufficiently considered whether it was
“concrete.” 27 The Court held that it was not sufficient to create standing
for Congress to create a statutory right and a private right of action to
enforce it. The violation of the statutory right must also be a “concrete”
injury. 28 A “bare procedural violation” of a statute, the Court held, does
not rise to the level of a concrete injury, even if Congress also grants a
right to sue and collect statutory damages. 29
But the Court did not decide whether Robins had pleaded a concrete
injury, or whether the violation he alleged was “concrete” or merely
“procedural.” Instead, the Court laid out some guidelines for future courts
to make those assessments. Looking first to dictionaries and precedent,
the Court explained that “concrete” means “de facto,” “actually exists,”
“real” and not “abstract.” 30 To this unhelpful list of synonyms, the Court
added the caveat that “concrete” does not necessarily mean “tangible”—
a violation of an intangible right, such as free speech or free exercise of
religion, can be a concrete injury. 31
As for how to make the distinction between an intangible injury that
is merely procedural and not concrete, and an “intangible harm [that]
constitutes an injury in fact,” the Court stated that “both history and the
judgment of Congress play important roles.” 32 The role of “history” (i.e.,
25. Robins v. Spokeo, No. CV10-05306, 2011 WL 597867 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27,
2011), reinstatement granted, No. CV10-05306, 2011 WL 11562151 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2011), rev’d and remanded, 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 136 S.Ct. 1540,
(2016), as revised, (May 24, 2016), rev’d and remanded, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).
26. Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded by, Spokeo
v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016).
27. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016), as revised, (May 24, 2016).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1549.
30. Id. at 1548.
31. Id. at 1549.
32. Id.
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legal precedent) seems clear—if the injury in question resembles an injury
that the Court has historically recognized as concrete, then it is concrete.
The role of “the judgment of Congress” is less clear. The Court said
that Congress can “identify intangible harms” that meet the concreteness
requirement and can (per Lujan) “elevate to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.” 33 The Court added that “similarly” Justice Kennedy’s
Lujan concurring opinion stated that “Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before.” 34 Beyond that, Spokeo did not
explain exactly how Congress would “identify” and “elevate” such
injuries, how Congress would indicate that it had done so, or exactly what
weight courts should give that congressional judgment if they could
ascertain it.
Thus, Spokeo provides some guideposts, but does not resolve the
metaphysical “what is it?” conundrum at the heart of the injury in fact
requirement. And it does not really resolve the separation-of-powers issue
it purports to address, namely the role of Congress in identifying and
elevating intangible harms that were previously not considered concrete,
but now should be elevated to the status of injury in fact. While Spokeo
holds that courts need not defer to congressional judgments, it also did
direct courts to consider Congress’s views—however expressed. One
place courts might look for those views is in the remedial provisions, as
some courts already did before Spokeo was decided.
B.

Before Spokeo v. Robins

Before Spokeo, some courts had relied on Congress’s use of a
statutory damages remedy to infer that Congress intended for a statutory
violation to count as a constitutional injury in fact. The Ninth Circuit’s
approach in Spokeo (before the case reached the Supreme Court)
exemplifies this approach.
The Ninth Circuit held that the existence of an enforceable private
right of action indicates congressional intent to create a statutory right,
33. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578) (emphasis added).
34. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in
judgment)). The Court did not explain why those two understandings of Congress’s power are similar.
And, indeed, they do not seem reconcilable. The first posits that there exist in the world “concrete, de
facto injuries” that Congress can “identify” and “elevate” by creating a cause of action to enforce
them. The second seems to understand Congress to have the power to create—by “defin[ing] injuries”
and “articulat[ing] chains of causation”—a concrete injury, even where no “case or controversy . . .
existed before.” Id.
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and that “violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact
to confer standing.” 35 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, to have standing,
Robins did not need to allege any “actual harm,” beyond the violation of
the statutory right, because the FCRA awards statutory damages for any
willful violation. 36 Instead, “[w]hen, as here, the statutory cause of action
does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation
of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” 37 Thus the Ninth
Circuit relied on the remedy—statutory damages—to infer the injury
needed to establish standing.
The Ninth Circuit, was not the only court to employ this inferential
reasoning. In Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, an FCRA decision on which
the Ninth Circuit relied, the Sixth Circuit also held that, because the FCRA
“permits a recovery when there are no identifiable or measurable actual
damages,” it “implies that a claimant need not suffer (or allege)
consequential damages to file a claim.” 38 Beaudry examined the FCRA’s
damages provision and concluded that “[b]ecause ‘actual damages’
represent an alternative form of relief and because the statute permits a
recovery when there are no identifiable or measurable actual damages, [it]
implies that a claimant need not suffer (or allege) consequential damages
to file a claim.” 39 Other circuits have likewise held that “actual damages
are not required for standing under the FDCPA” (Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act), because it “permits the recovery of statutory damages up
to $1,000 in the absence of actual damages.” 40 In each of these cases, the
courts inferred what constituted an injury in fact for purposes of standing
from Congress’s inclusion of a statutory damages remedy.
C.

After Spokeo v. Robins

At first blush, the Supreme Court’s holding in Spokeo could be read
to put a constitutional stop to the practice of inferring injury in fact from

35. Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded, 136 S. Ct.
1540 (2016), as revised (May24, 2016) (citing Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
528 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2008); Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 517 (9th Cir. 2010)).
36. Robins v. Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 412.
37. Id. at 413.
38. 579 F.3d 702, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2009).
39. Id.
40. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Keele v.
Wexler, 149 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1998), Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir.
1982), Gambardella v. G. Fox & Co., 716 F.2d 104, 108 n. 4 (2d Cir.1983) (holding same under the
Truth in Lending Act)).

2018]

STATUTORY DAMAGES AFTER SPOKEO

133

the congressional choice to authorize statutory damages. 41 Spokeo could
be read to hold that, regardless of congressional intent, one has
constitutional standing only if one suffered a “concrete,” as opposed to
“procedural,” injury. 42 Congress’s decision to create a statutory right and
to provide a remedy would not be sufficient to “elevate” an injury to the
status of “concrete.”
But, as discussed, Spokeo did not answer the question of what exactly
constitutes a concrete injury. And Spokeo did instruct courts making that
determination to consider: “the judgment of Congress,” Congress’s ability
to “identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements,” and Congress’s decision to “elevate” such harms by
authorizing suit.43 When courts implement those instructions and try to
ascertain Congress’s intent, they can still fruitfully consider Congress’s
choice of remedy. When Congress chooses to include a statutory damages
remedy, it indicates, at minimum, that Congress identified a wrong to be
curtailed, and that Congress believed that individual suits were a
reasonable and effective means of doing so. Where the conduct targeted
by the legislation potentially affects the individual plaintiff (i.e., is
particularized), congressional inclusion of a statutory damages remedy
may also indicate that Congress believed that the wrong is injurious to
individuals, even if its effects are nonmonetary or difficult to quantify or
identify.
Still, just because Congress authorizes a minimum damages amount,
that cannot be taken to mean that Congress intends to recognize a
constitutional injury in fact. I propose that courts consider a number of
factors when determining whether a statutory remedial scheme should
give rise to an inference that Congress has identified an intangible injury
to be elevated to a concrete injury in fact. Based on those factors, different
remedial schemes can be placed on a spectrum between two types of
schemes: (1) a true statutory damages scheme, which can give rise to an
inference that Congress has identified an injury in fact and (2) a minimum
damages scheme, which cannot.
41. When Spokeo returned to the Ninth Circuit on remand, that court abandoned its reliance on
the statutory damages remedy to infer Congress’s intent. It used a zone-of-interest-type analysis: if
the statutory violation is of a procedural requirement, and that procedural requirement was designed
to protect against a harm that Congress identified, and that harm is concrete, then violating the
procedure is, itself, a harm, and thus an injury in fact. The Ninth Circuit found that the interest
protected by the FCRA (“accurate credit reporting”) was “concrete,” and that therefore the procedural
violations that Robins alleged were a “concrete” injury. Robins v. Spokeo, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 491554 (Jan. 22, 2018).
42. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), revised, (May 24, 2016).
43. Id.
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At one end of the spectrum lie true statutory damages schemes,
where Congress (1) authorizes recovery of actual damages, (2) authorizes
a separate, alternative recovery of fixed damages, and (3) labels the fixed
damages as “statutory” or “liquidated” damages explicitly. For example,
the Wiretap Act authorizes recovery of the sum of the “actual damages
suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of
the violation” or “statutory damages.” 44The key characteristic that these
factors identify is that Congress has recognized that the wrong to be
curtailed can give rise to actual injury (hence the actual damages) and that
the difficulty of proving or quantifying the amount of damages
necessitates an alternative award of statutory or liquidated damages to
substitute for actual damages.
At the other end of the spectrum lie minimum damages schemes,
where Congress authorizes recovery of actual damages and then sets a
minimum amount—but the recovery of the minimum amount depends on
eligibility for actual damages. These remedial schemes, while setting a
minimum amount for recovery, lack the three factors present in true
statutory damages schemes.
For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 provides that “the United
States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of
actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than
the sum of $1,000.” 45 The Supreme Court examined this damages scheme
in Doe v. Chao, and held that it requires plaintiffs to prove they have
suffered some actual injury from a statutory violation before they can
recover the statutorily defined minimum damages of $1,000. 46 Doe
alleged that the Department of Labor had violated the Privacy Act
because, while processing his black lung benefits application, it had used
his Social Security number on official agency documents, including some
sent to third parties. The government conceded the violation but argued
that Doe had not suffered any actual harm. The Supreme Court held that
the language and structure of the Privacy Act’s damages provision quoted
above mean that a plaintiff must prove some actual injury from a violation
before being entitled to the statutory minimum damages. The Court
focused its close textual analysis on the phrase “a person entitled to
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c)(2)(A-B) (emphasis added).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Stored Communications Act 18
U.S.C. § 2707; Vista Mktg., LLC v. Burkett, 812 F.3d 954, 975 (11th Cir. 2016); Van Alstyne v. Elec.
Scriptorium, Ltd., 560 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2009) (both holding that the Stored Communications
Act, requires proof of actual injury).
46. 540 U.S. 614, 624–25 (2004).
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recovery” which the statute uses to describe the class of plaintiffs eligible
to receive the minimum damages. The Court reasoned that only a plaintiff
who was actually injured (and thus entitled to actual damages) was
“entitled to recovery,” and, therefore, eligible for the minimum
damages. 47 The statute did not create an alternative, statutory damages
award—it merely set a minimum amount on the actual damages a plaintiff
could recover. But, to recover the minimum damages award, the plaintiff
had to prove she had suffered an actual injury. 48
Even after Spokeo, Congress’s choice of a particular remedial
scheme can be informative as to Congress’s intent regarding
constitutional standing and injury in fact. Following the Court’s reasoning
in Doe v. Chao, where Congress has only set a minimum damages award,
no inference should be drawn that Congress intended to eliminate the
plaintiff’s burden to prove an injury—and, likewise, no inference should
be drawn that Congress intended to elevate an intangible injury to the
status of a concrete injury in fact. But when Congress employs a true
statutory damages scheme, and thus indicates the intent to eliminate the
plaintiff’s burden to prove actual injury, courts can infer that Congress
intended to elevate an intangible injury to the status of a concrete injury
in fact.
Other remedial schemes, including the FCRA provision at issue in
Spokeo, fall somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum. As noted,
for willful violations, the FCRA authorizes recovery of “any actual
damages sustained . . . or damages of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000.” 49 Thus, it does specifically provide for both actual and minimum
damages, and it does specify that the minimum damages are an alternative
to actual damages (“or”). But it does not label the minimum damages
“statutory” or “liquidated” damages, or otherwise indicate either way who
should be eligible for them. 50
47. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004). In Doe v. Chao, the Court also compared the remedial
scheme to similar remedies at common law—precisely the analysis based on “history” that it would
later recommend in Spokeo. The Court explained that that the Act’s remedial scheme “parallels” the
remedial scheme for certain common law defamation torts where a plaintiff could recover general
damages only after first proving “special harm” that was “of a material and generally of a pecuniary
nature.” 540 U.S. at 625 (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 617. Although Doe v. Chao was not explicitly about constitutional standing, the Court
recognized that the inquiry into what constitutes “actual damages” overlaps with the constitutional
injury in fact inquiry. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. at 625–26 (noting that by making the “guaranteed
minimum contingent upon some showing of actual damages [Congress avoided] giveaways to
plaintiffs with nothing more than “abstract injuries’”) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
101–02 (1983)).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
50. Id.
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Another statute that falls in the middle of the spectrum is the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), which authorizes recovery of “actual
damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500.” 51
On the one hand, the DPPA does not use language like “or” to specify that
the fixed damages amount is an alternative to actual damages—it suggests
that the fixed amount is a minimum (“not less than”). 52 But on the other
hand, it calls the fixed damages “liquidated damages,” indicating that they
are intended as a substitute for actual damages. 53 For such statutes, the
particular structure and language of the remedial scheme can be
informative (depending on the particular factors identified above and the
scheme’s similarity to or difference from other statutory schemes), but it
will not conclusively establish Congress’s intent.54
III. CONCLUSION
Before Spokeo, some courts inferred the existence of injury in fact—
and thus constitutional standing—from Congress’s use of statutory or
liquidated damages provisions. Spokeo holds that that inference cannot
conclusively decide the standing issue. But it does not invalidate the
reasoning underlying it. And, because Spokeo also directs courts to inquire
into and consider congressional intent, that same reasoning can be used
for that inquiry.
Inferring Congress’s intent to identify an intangible harm and elevate
it to the level of injury in fact requires close attention to the structure and
language of the remedial provisions. Where Congress has created a true
statutory damages scheme—one that allows for both actual damages to
remedy actual injuries, and also statutory damages to remedy intangible
injuries—courts should continue to infer that Congress has identified an
intangible injury that it intends to elevate to the status of a “concrete”
injury in fact. But when Congress merely sets a minimum amount for
actual damages, courts should not make any inference regarding injury
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1) (emphasis added).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(1); see Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 310 (1992) (noting that
“liquidated damages . . . compensate[] at fixed levels that may or may not correspond to a particular
plaintiff’s actual loss”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (liquidated damages
are permitted when they reasonably substitute for likely actual damages).
54. In such instances, other factors may be relevant, including legislative history and
separation-of-powers concerns. Perhaps another fruitful distinction might be drawn between statutes
that create private rights of action and award statutory damages in suits against the federal
government, and those that do so in suits against private parties. For example, in FAA v. Cooper, the
Court attributed its narrow reading of the damages provision in Doe v. Chao in part to the fact that
“the Privacy Act waive[d] the federal government’s sovereign immunity.” 566 U.S. 284, 299 (2012).
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and should continue to require plaintiffs to plead and prove a recognized
actual injury to meet the injury in fact requirement.

